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ABSTRACT 
 
I continue to maintain that David Lewis’s concept of overlapping persons cannot 
yield pre-measurement uncertainty in the Everett interpretation of quantum 
mechanics in the way that Simon Saunders and David Wallace originally seemed to 
suggest. However, I argue that in their reply to me they make it clear that they do not 
wish to invoke overlap of persons after all. That makes it mysterious why they 
defended their interpretation of personal overlap in the first place and questionable 
what role overlap has to play in their proposal. If Everettian branching can be 
understood to involve the divergence of distinct, non-overlapping worlds a concept 
of pre-measurement uncertainty is available. That idea was first proposed by David 
Deutsch but required an ad hoc postulate. Saunders has recently suggested that a 
similar scheme arises naturally out of the physics. If correct, that is important as it 
offers escape from some bizarre consequences of current alternative ways of 
understanding probability in the Everett interpretation.    
 
1 Everett and Uncertainty  
2 Against Overlap Again 
3 Divergence Without Overlap 
 
 
1 Everett and Uncertainty 
 
In conventional stochastic quantum mechanics a given quantum measurement has a range of possible outcomes 
with associated probabilities and an irreducibly probabilistic process takes place that determines which of the 
outcomes actually occurs. According to the interpretation which owes its origin to Hugh Everett III [1957] what 
takes place, roughly speaking, is the splitting of the world into the occurrence of all outcomes, each in a branch 
with an associated novel physical quantity, sometimes called branch weight or cross-section, which is 
numerically equal to the stochastic probabilities. On the face of it, it does not look as if an informed subject 
believing the Everett interpretation prior to making a measurement can be uncertain as to what outcome s/he will 
observe; s/he will observe all possible outcomes, each in a different branch.  
Since quantum-mechanical predictions are typically probabilistic and supporting evidence for those 
predictions typically takes the form of observations of outcome frequencies over extended experimental runs, it 
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is not obvious how quantum mechanics is testable on the Everett interpretation. However, much ingenuity has 
gone into trying to resolve this problem. Proposed solutions fall into two camps, either claiming or denying that 
a notion of uncertainty is required. This paper addresses a dispute in the former camp. 
An issue of this journal contained a proposal by Simon Saunders and David Wallace [2008a] together 
with my critique of it [2008] and a reply by Saunders and Wallace [2008b]. That proposal claimed to describe a 
way in which pre-measurement uncertainty is possible on the Everett interpretation. I have since argued [2010] 
that the status of the interpretation as a scientific theory, preserving the testability of quantum mechanics, does 
not require pre-measurement uncertainty but does require the possibility of post-measurement, pre-observation 
uncertainty. The idea that post-measurement uncertainty could have an important role to play was first suggested 
by Lev Vaidman [1998]. 
My [2010] argument entailed some bizarre consequences such as the infamous idea that an informed 
observer believing Everett should expect to always survive a round of so-called quantum Russian roulette where 
a quantum measurement issues in a branch with substantial cross-section where the downstream observer is 
instantly killed before having time to observe the outcome1. I claimed that such bizarre consequences could only 
have repercussions for our perception of the human predicament and could not undermine the scientific status of 
the Everett interpretation.  However, if a concept of pre-measurement uncertainty is available the bizarre 
consequences can be avoided and, given the choice, supporters of the interpretation would surely prefer to do 
without them. That’s why it is important to establish whether pre-measurement uncertainty really is tenable. 
 
2 Against Overlap Again 
 
Saunders’ and Wallace’s proposal centrally involved a concept of overlapping individuals first introduced by 
David Lewis [1976]. I shall begin by briefly describing how I originally thought their proposal was supposed to 
work for a simplified model of Everettian branching before turning my attention to their Reply, which 
undermines that original reading. I shall then consider the fallout of this impasse. 
 Lewis adopts the so-called worm theory of transtemporal identity which identifies a persisting object 
with its history, a spacetime world-tube. Suppose that a measuring apparatus is prepared to measure the spin of a 
particle relative to a chosen direction so that, according to stochastic quantum mechanics, there are two possible 
outcomes, UP and DOWN. On the simplified Everett picture there are two downstream branches. One where 
there is ApparatusUP, showing the result UP, one where there is the ApparatusDOWN. If the concept of 
Lewisian overlap is applied here then both ApparatusUP and ApparatusDOWN are to be identified with their 
histories and their histories overlap prior to measurement. So ApparatusUP and ApparatusDOWN both exist 
throughout the whole process. They overlap prior to the measurement and diverge after it, which is to say that 
before the measurement they have segments of their history, temporal stages, in common. 
Likewise there are two observers of the apparatuses, HydraUP and HydraDOWN. Prior to the 
measurement the observers overlap, they share bodily stages, but they can nonetheless make numerically distinct 
simultaneous utterances. Thus prior to measurement a single vocal event which sounds like an utterance of ‘I am 
either HydraUP or HydraDOWN but I don’t know which’ is actually two distinct utterances made separately by 
                                                
1 I have also argued that similar bizarre consequences arise for attempts to understand probability in the Everett 
interpretation which do not invoke uncertainty. See Tappenden [2004]. 
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the two distinct observers. This attribution of utterances to worm-persons departs from Lewis’s own preference, 
as Saunders and Wallace point out ([2008a], pp. 295-296) but I have not taken issue with that. What I have 
argued ([2008], pp. 309-312) is that even if this utterance attribution is allowed it still does not warrant either 
observer prior to measurement being able to intelligibly say ‘I will see UP or DOWN but I don’t know which’. 
The reason being that neither observer can reliably refer to herself with an utterance of ‘I’ since any utterance of 
‘I’ by the observers during overlap is manifest as a single vocal event. As I saw it, Saunders and Wallace 
supplied no reason why HydraUP’s pre-measurement utterance of ‘I’ should refer to herself rather than 
HydraDOWN so I claimed that they were helping themselves the semantic rule which they stated as:  
 
the word ‘I’ refers to the speaker in any sentence in which it occurs ([2008a], p. 295, 
original italics) 
 
I dubbed this rule - I’s Right ([2008], p. 309). I argued that it looks innocuous but needs a warrant in contexts of 
overlap where speakers putatively share one and the same bodily stages. In their Reply, Saunders and Wallace 
seem to think they had supplied the needed warrant: 
 
A “world”, recall, is for us a four-dimensional non-branching entity realised by the 
branching structure of the quantum state; any such world is “quasi-classical”, isomorphic 
on sufficiently coarse-grained levels to the familiar world of people and animals, chairs and 
tables. Tappenden is welcome to tell whatever referential story he likes within that world, 
and it will go exactly the same way as in the non-branching case. If, for instance, he feels 
that his using ‘I’ to refer to himself relies on a causal link between a stage of himself and 
his utterance, that causal link is available to him - provided he is happy with an emergent 
notion of causation relativised to a world, and with a notion of stage likewise relativised. 
([2008b], p. 315, original emphasis) 
 
But there’s something seriously wrong here. Of course, if the notion of stage is ‘relativised to a world’ there is 
no problem with claiming I’s Right. In that case, HydraUP’s bodily stages prior to measurement reside in a 
world of sailing ships and sealing wax and the result UP whilst HydraDOWN’s stages reside in a world of 
cabbages and kings and the result DOWN. But then HydraUP and HydraDOWN don’t overlap prior to 
measurement! So why did Saunders and Wallace expend so much effort in their original proposal defending their 
version of Lewis’s overlapping persons? 
If the everyday worlds in which HydraUP and HydraDOWN say ‘I will see UP or DOWN but I don’t 
know which’ do not have the vocal events which instantiate matched utterances in common, if those vocal events 
are isomorphic but each in a separate, non-overlapping world, then HydraUP’s ‘I’ can refer to her via the vocal 
event which is a part of a stage of her body and likewise for HydraDOWN. So what role is overlap supposed to 
play in Saunders’ and Wallace’s proposal? What’s going on? 
There’s a clue in the following exchange. I wrote:  
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prior to measurement HydraUP sees ApparatusUP, the apparatus which is going to display 
the result UP, and HydraDOWN sees ApparatusDOWN. But not everything in the Hydras’ 
pre-measurement environment inhabits the proposed two worlds. Events and temporal 
stages of sufficiently short duration are common to both worlds. Thus if HydraUP and 
HydraDOWN see a lightening flash outside their respective laboratory windows prior to 
measurement then they both refer to one and the same lightening flash even though they 
each refer, supposedly, to numerically distinct apparatuses and windows. ([2008], p. 311) 
 
They responded : 
 
Talk of ‘lightening flashes’, in particular, will not do : such events are themselves 
quasiclassical in nature, describable only in decoherent-history terms. (To make this vivid, 
note that in the time taken by a lightening flash - a process of a few milliseconds - 
decoherence will produce branching into countless billions of segments of decohering 
histories, even using quite a coarse-grained notion of individual branches.) 
As we noted in our original paper, on our semantics what is common to worlds 
cannot be captured in ordinary words. In metaphysics or physics, it requires technical 
language (‘temporal parts’ ; ‘segment of a decoherent history’.) ([2008b], p. 316)  
 
 
My earlier characterisation of the predicament of HydraUP and HydraDOWN was highly simplified. It is of 
course quite right to point out that a lightening flash is a thicket of branchings in Everett’s multiverse. But so is a 
vocal event which instantiates an utterance of ‘I’. Again, if vocal events are not common to Saunders’ and 
Wallace’s decohering worlds there is no problem with personal self-reference and their original discussion of 
overlapping persons is simply irrelevant. But they do apparently want overlap at a sub-decoherence timescale. 
What’s that about ? How is that serving to sustain non-overlapping coarse-grainedly isomorphic worlds at the 
scale of lightening flashes and utterances of ‘I’ ? An explanation seems called for. 
Saunders [2010] changes tack. There he suggests that a technique which he calls vector mereology can be 
used to distinguish worlds at the sub-decoherence timescale so that there is non-commonality of objects all the 
way up, so to speak, and overlap falls out of the picture. It would not be appropriate to discuss Saunders’s new 
proposal in detail here but before closing I shall say something in general about the use of non-overlapping, 
diverging worlds to introduce pre-measurement uncertainty to the Everett interpretation. 
 
3 Divergence Without Overlap 
 
The idea that pre-measurement uncertainty is available if Everett branching can be understood in terms of the 
divergence of a fibre-bundle of parallel worlds was first fielded, so far as I know, by David Deutsch. He wrote : 
 
In order to solve this problem, I propose a slight change in the Everett interpretation : 
 
 5 
Axiom 8. The world consists of  continuously infinite-measured set of universes. 
 
By a ‘measured set’ I mean a set together with a measure on that set. The interpretation of 
the state (27) [equation p. 13] will be that the set of universes consists of n1 disjoint subsets, 
where the a1th subset is of measure |Ca1|2. Each of these subsets, which I shall call a 
branch, consists of a continuous infinity of identical universes. During the model 
measurement, the world has initially only one branch, and is partitioned into n1 branches. 
The branches play the same role as individual universes do in Everett’s original version, but 
the probabilistic interpretation is now truly ‘built in’. ([1985], p. 20, original italics) 
 
Michael Lockwood adapted this idea to his ‘many minds’ version of the Everett interpretation ([1989], pp.230-
232). Clearly the divergence of universes in this scheme must not arise out of stochastic processes within them. 
But all the appeal of the Everett interpretation resides in its not going beyond quantum mechanics as is. The 
addition of a postulate like Deutsch’s Axiom 8 is inelegant, to say the least, and never met with much 
enthusiasm. 
If Saunders has indeed found a way to derive a diverging fibre-bundle picture from the physics and 
nothing but the physics then that is important. It offers the only way currently in prospect of understanding 
probability in the Everett interpretation which does not bring with it bizarre consequences such as inevitable 
survival of quantum Russian roulette. 
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